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Afterword: The Libertarian Middle Way
Randy E. Barnett*
Libertarians are often portrayed as radicals and, in a sense, this is
accurate. The three senses of “radical” could each be said to characterize
libertarianism: (1) “(especially of change or action) relating to or affecting
the fundamental nature of something; far-reaching or thorough,” (2)
“characterized by departure from tradition; innovative or progressive,” and
(3) “of or relating to the root of something.”1 Libertarians do make claims
about the fundamental nature of things, and strive to be thorough in the
application of their principles. Libertarian policies often are a departure
from tradition, though as we shall see, libertarianism is deeply rooted in the
classical liberal western tradition associated with the Enlightenment (and
its roots could easily be traced still farther back in time).2 Libertarians do
strive to go to the root of how society should be structured, and they claim
that root to be liberty.3
But, although libertarians sometimes appear to place a primacy on
liberty in the political sphere, to the exclusion of other ends, this
appearance is deceptive and easily mischaracterized. As I will explain in
this essay, while some libertarians may promote liberty as an end in itself,
for most, liberty is a means to other ends. Liberty enables the individual
who is living in society with others to pursue happiness, or the good life.
The good life is an ultimate end consisting of a myriad of subordinate ends,
from love to charity to excellence in one’s intellectual and physical powers.
While all humans share a nature in common with others—the nature that
differentiates us from other creatures—no human’s potential is exactly the
same as any other. And our common nature requires that our virtues be
developed from our own choices, not imposed from above. As my teacher
Henry Veatch instructed, living a good life is a do-it-yourself affair.4
*
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center.
Permission to reprint in whole or part for nonprofit educational purposes is hereby granted.
1 Radical
Definition,
OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/american_english/radical (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
2 See DAVID BOAZ, LIBERTARIANISM: A PRIMER 27–52 (1997) (exploring the early history of
libertarianism); GEORGE H. SMITH, THE SYSTEM OF LIBERTY: THEMES IN THE HISTORY OF CLASSICAL
LIBERALISM (2013) (describing the basic tenets of classical liberalism).
3 On the origins of modern libertarianism, see BOAZ, supra note 2, at 52–58; BRIAN DOHERTY,
RADICALS FOR CAPITALISM: A FREEWHEELING HISTORY OF THE MODERN AMERICAN LIBERTARIAN
MOVEMENT passim (2007).
4 See, e.g., HENRY B. VEATCH, RATIONAL MAN: A MODERN INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTELIAN
ETHICS (Liberty Fund, Inc. 2003) (1962); see also HENRY B. VEATCH, FOR AN ONTOLOGY OF MORALS:
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So most libertarians hold the “radical” views they do for the very
same types of reasons that others hold theirs: they believe that people will
be better off in the highest sense if their liberties are acknowledged and
respected. Libertarians would not bother to hold and advocate their views if
they did not care about the well-being of others; they would just go about
their business. Instead, they expend their scarce energy and resources
learning which social structures work best, and which worse, and then
advance their answers against the contending alternatives.
In this sense, then, libertarians are no more “radical” than others who
advocate societal reform by identifying goals towards which they think
social structures should strive. They just have a different view of how
society should be structured so as to make people better off. But the point I
want to make in this essay is that libertarianism is the opposite of radical, if
by radical, you mean extreme. Libertarianism today is actually a moderate
middle ground between two contemporary extremes: the social justice
crowd on the Left, and the legal moralists on the Right (though both
positions have much in common, there is no logical reason why one cannot
hold both at the same time, as some do, and what is considered "left" and
"right" will vary over time).
THE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND LEGAL MORALIST EXTREMES5
The social justice crowd holds some version of the view that everyone
is entitled to some quantum of stuff; and if they do not have whatever it is
that a particular social justice theorist thinks they ought to have, we need a
coercive government with the power to take from those who have this stuff
and give it to those who do not. This sometimes also entails that no one
should have any, or too much, more stuff than anyone else. Whether the
standard be absolute or comparative, however, social justice consists of
everyone having whatever they are supposed to have according to the
advocate of social justice.
There are at least three fundamental problems associated with this
position. The first is that there is no single and salient answer to what
everyone is supposed to have. Almost everyone who advocates for social
justice has either a different view of this or, more commonly in my
experience, no firm view they are willing to articulate. For example, try
asking someone who says that “the rich” are not paying their “fair share” of
A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL THEORY (1971).
5 In this section, I offer some generalizations about the approaches I label as “social justice” and
“legal moralism.” These descriptions are based on my experience as an academic listening to such
views being offered by my colleagues, and in more popular discourse, and I do not offer any specific
iterations by particular advocates. Instead, I paint with a broad brush. The persuasiveness of this
critique will turn on whether the descriptions I offer seem to match the reader’s own exposure to these
views. For example, if, unlike me, the reader is aware of specific structural proposals (apart from
invocations of democracy) by advocates of these views to ensure that the correct conception of either
social justice or legal moralism is initially adopted and maintained over time, then my claim that there
are no such generally-accepted proposals will be undermined.
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taxes, “OK, what is the “fair share?” You will either get a blank look or a
single word answer: “more.” Whatever the “well-off” are now paying, they
should be paying more. Whatever the less-well-off have, they should have
more. How much more? Not saying. Just more.
This lack of specificity makes crafting actual policies extremely
unstable. There is no core position around which any political consensus
may be formed. There is no identifiable limit beyond which the policy of
redistribution can be deemed unjust. Even if the existence of consensus is
an unrealistic demand to make of social justice advocates, in its absence,
whatever policy may actually be implemented will be politically unstable.
Only the subgroup that favors the prevailing plan will be satisfied that
social justice is being done. No matter how much redistribution of income
or wealth is adopted, there will always be cries for more or different forms,
which will greatly undermine the security of everyone’s possessions, and
the ability to plan. Then there are the many who will persist in objecting to
using force to achieve social justice. This is not a recipe for a peaceful and
contented society.
A second problem is that achieving any particular pattern of
distribution will require enormously intrusive government administrative
mechanisms. Some subset of a society will need to be given special powers
to collect the information of everyone’s wealth or income. This is not some
accidental occurrence that can somehow be avoided; it is absolutely
necessary to know from whom to take the wealth and to whom to give it
according to the approved pattern of social justice. Collecting this
information will necessarily be privacy invasive, and the existence of a
database with such information can lead to the intimidation of dissidents.
Finally, a third problem was identified most prominently by Robert
Nozick: whatever level of redistribution is adopted will require the
continual use of force to achieve and maintain over time. The natural
outcome of liberty will inevitably destroy whatever pattern of holdings is
adopted as the socially “just” one.6 In addition to collecting the relevant
information to discover how actual holdings differ from this pattern, some
subset of persons will need to be empowered to use force to continually
adjust holdings so they conform.
These three fundamental problems lead to the following megaproblem with social justice policies: Any institution powerful enough to
gather this information and enforce the pattern will be highly intrusive and
enormously dangerous. Not only will it have the exceptional power to
violate the background rights that libertarians advocate as the prerequisite
for pursuing happiness in a social context, it will also have the power to
deviate from the pattern favored by any particular social justice advocate.
These institutions of coercion may adopt a different vision of social
6 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 160–64 (1974) (describing how liberty
upsets patterns).
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justice—or other ends entirely, such as legal moralism—that will violate
the conception of social justice favored by any given proponent. And when
one acknowledges realistically that there is no uniquely salient pattern of
distribution, the highly contested nature of social justice makes the
potential for abuse even greater. Because one cannot prove one’s
conception is the right one, a perpetual struggle to control the institutions of
coercion becomes inevitable, unless dissenters are somehow suppressed or
eliminated, which historically is what happens to dissidents in societies
committed to some conception of social justice.
It is not enough, therefore, for social justice advocates to identify a
uniquely salient pattern of holdings as the socially just one, though this is
essential. They must also identify the structural features of a legal system
that can assure that the just pattern—and only the just pattern—will be
adopted, and that the powers required to monitor and perpetuate the just
pattern will not be captured and abused to the detriment of social justice. I
am not even asking for an ironclad guarantee, but merely a reasonable
assurance that some approximation of the right pattern of social justice will
be adopted initially and maintained over time. In my experience, such
assurances have not been forthcoming.
Legal moralists have a comparable set of problems. Indeed, we can
simply port much of the above analysis of social justice over to legal
moralism. Legal moralists focus their attention, not on how much stuff each
person has, but on how each person ought to act when living his or her life.
Each person should behave just the way legal moralists believe he or she
ought to behave or be sanctioned by law. However, like social justice
proponents, legal moralists disagree among themselves about the correct
set of moral behaviors.
Of course, all legal moralists would maintain that acts like murder,
rape, robbery, and theft, which violate the rights of others, should be
banned—a belief they share in common with libertarians. For this reason,
to preserve the distinction between libertarianism and legal moralism, it is
important to distinguish between justice—which consists of prohibiting
“wrongful” conduct that violates the rights of others—and morality or
ethics, which evaluates the full gamut of human action to distinguish good
from bad conduct.
All libertarians, and most everyone else, believe that force is justified
to prohibit unjust or wrongful behavior; but legal moralists would extend
the use of force to reach some or all immoral or unethical conduct as well.
But while the consensus that murder, rape, robbery and theft are wrongful
and may be legally forbidden is widespread—indeed universal—there is no
comparable consensus about how all people ought to act, or which moral
code should be imposed on a society.
Assuming some uniquely salient moral code was identified, however,
like social justice advocates, legal moralists require a powerful and
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intrusive set of legal institutions to gather information on how everyone is
behaving in public or private to detect whether they are behaving morally
or not. Any institution that is powerful enough to accomplish this would be
susceptible to enormous abuse. And this potential for abuse is even greater
than it would be if a uniquely salient moral code were capable of being
identified, which is a prerequisite for confining those who hold power to
those identifiable limits.
IS DEMOCRACY THE ANSWER?
When confronted by these inherent and fundamental problems with
their positions, both social justice advocates and legal moralists tend to
offer the same response: democracy. We just let people vote on the correct
pattern of distribution, the correct moral code, or both. But this is simply
avoiding the issue by creating a “black box” solution. Although majority
rule might arrive at some outcome, given the contested nature of both
concepts, it is not likely to be a stable outcome as winners must continually
fend off losers. And this solution assumes, of course, that democracy is
maintained after the initial vote, which is not typically the case in countries
pursuing either a social justice or legal moralist agenda.
More fundamentally, how exactly is majority rule supposed to arrive
at policies of either social justice or morality that are correct according to
the theories of social justice or morality advanced by any particular
proponent? What sorts of arguments about the right outcome could political
advocates even make? What would a legislative debate about the right
distribution or correct morality look like beyond a mere assertion of one’s
conclusion in the form of one’s vote? In short, what exactly makes the
majority’s vote (on any given day) the right outcome from the standpoint
of either social justice or morality?
Yet, if there is no assurance that a majority of a group of individuals
who are denominated “legislators” or “representatives,” or a majority of the
body politic voting in a referendum, will vote for the right outcome, then
how exactly is democracy the solution to the problem of the radical
indeterminacy of the social justice or legal moralist perspectives? Far from
being a solution to the problem of arriving at the right conception of social
justice or legal morality, the appeal to democracy either disguises or merely
restates the problem and then sweeps it under the rug.
In the end, both social justice and legal moralism assume a “God’s eye
view” of either how all physical resources in a given society should be
allocated or how all persons should behave in their personal and public
lives. Indeed, one could easily conclude that social justice proponents and
legal moralists are simply substituting a secular government for an
interventionist God to create their own heaven on earth. But any such
project is simply beyond the capacity of the actual human beings we must
rely upon to devise and implement such a scheme. Hypothesizing about the
demos does not solve, or even seriously address, this problem.
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Moreover, because both social justice and legal moralist visions are
comprehensive approaches to social arrangements, any preferred position
necessarily implies the rejection of all competing positions. To adopt any
one pattern of distribution is to reject all other contending patterns; to adopt
any one moral code is to reject all alternative moral codes. Not only do the
comprehensive natures of both approaches make them inherently
unstable—as those who favor alternative conceptions continue to agitate
for their view of “justice” or “morality”—but this very instability has
historically engendered highly coercive and often brutal measures to
suppress dissent from the prevailing position. Whether enforced brutally or
not, however, every loser of this perpetual struggle must be forced to live
their life in a regime that he or she takes to be unjust or immoral. The
inevitable result of this dynamic is a Hobbesian war of all against all.
THE ROOTS OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM IN RELIGIOUS TOLERATION
While I wish I could claim that any of the foregoing analysis is new or
original, the recognition of these problems is as old as liberalism itself.
Indeed, the origin of classical liberalism, which begat modern
libertarianism, can be traced to the devastating consequences of religious
wars during which comprehensive religious views fought violently against
each other. And why should contending religions not take up arms against
their rivals? If eternal salvation is at stake, and salvation requires living in a
society in which others all believe accordingly, why should religion not be
fought over to the death? Nor has this stance been eradicated from
modernity. We see it today in the radical Islamist jihadist movement that is
gaining steam in a large part of the world, both in its deadliest form and in
its drive to adopt Sharia law in “democratic” societies that is then
coercively imposed on believers and nonbelievers alike.
The classical liberal solution to the problem of religious wars was
religious toleration: the view that matters of conscience were matters of
individual choice.7 Notwithstanding that one’s eternal soul might be at
stake, these proto-liberals contended that it was better for individuals to be
free to choose their religions than to adopt a comprehensive one-religionfor-all policy that led to perpetual and deadly domestic and foreign strife.
Those favoring toleration need not, and did not, deny that one religion
was right and the rest were wrong; in other words, they need not adopt the
stance of religious relativism. Instead, they needed only to recognize that
the determination of which religion was the true one was sufficiently
contestable, and inevitably contested, as to make the imposition of one
religion on all a highly unstable and destructive approach to social
ordering. Even from the point of view of religious truth, while the best
outcome might be to have one’s own true religion imposed on others, the
7 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 18 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1950)
(1689) (advocating for religious toleration).
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worst outcome would be to have another’s false religion imposed on you.
Everyone’s second-best outcome is to be free to exercise his or her own
religion without imposing on others, which makes this policy the most
stable and conducive to social peace.
For this reason, rather than have one religion imposed coercively by a
monarch, the liberal solution to religious strife was for each individual to
be considered the King or sovereign of his own conscience. Each
individual was to live side-by-side with other individual sovereigns of their
own conscience, the way monarchs of countries under the Treaty of
Westphalia were supposed to live in peace with their neighbors and to
refrain from forcibly interfering with the internal affairs of other sovereign
monarchs.
For Westphalian monarchical sovereignty to work, however, the
geographical borders within which each monarch was free to determine
internal domestic policies without outside interference must be identifiable
and established. By the same token, the individual sovereignty entailed by
religious toleration requires the identification and establishment of
boundaries within which individuals have the jurisdiction to choose how to
worship. While matters of conscience lie entirely within one’s mind, the
practice or free exercise of religion requires action, and action requires the
use of physical resources.
What physical resources are properly within the boundaries of
individual sovereigns? The liberal answer to this jurisdictional question
was the concept of private property: property in one’s own person, and also
in external possessions. As Locke put it, the commonwealth is “a society of
men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their
own civil interests.”8 These interests are “life, liberty, health, and indolency
of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands,
houses, furniture, and the like.”9
It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of equal laws, to
secure unto all the people in general, and to every one of his subjects in
particular, the just possession of these things belonging to this life. If anyone
presume to violate the laws of public justice and equity, established for the
preservation of those things, his presumption is to be checked by the fear of
punishment consisting of the deprivation or diminution of those civil interests or
goods which otherwise he might and ought to enjoy. But seeing no man does
willingly suffer himself to be punished by the deprivation of any part of his
goods, and much less of his liberty or life, therefore is the magistrate armed with
the force and strength of all his subjects, in order to the punishment of those that
violate any other man’s rights.10

With this conception of the proper scope of civil government, Locke
concluded that, because “the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches
8
9
10

Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
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only to these civil concernments . . . all civil power, right and dominion is
bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things” and “it
neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the salvation of
souls.”11
Nor could the power to impose religious belief “be vested in the
magistrate by the consent of the people.”12 This is because some rights are
inalienable, meaning they cannot be surrendered to government even by
consent.
[N]o man can so far abandon the care of his own salvation as blindly to leave to
the choice of any other, whether prince or subject, to prescribe to him what faith
or worship he shall embrace. For no man can, if he would, conform his faith to
the dictates of another. All the life and power of true religion consist in the
inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is not faith without believing.13

In this way, individual sovereignty with respect to matters of conscience
took priority over any collective consent.
In sum, the liberal solution to the Hobbesian war of all-against-all
created by comprehensive religious claims was not to posit a sovereign
monarch or Leviathan to settle on the true religion for all—indeed that was
the source of religious wars—but instead to shift the conception of
sovereignty over religious belief and exercise from the monarch to the
people, with “the people” referring to the plural of individual persons, each
with his or her own conscience. As explained by Locke, “one man does not
violate the right of another by his erroneous opinions and undue manner of
worship, nor is his perdition any prejudice to another man’s affairs,
therefore, the care of each man’s salvation belongs only to himself.”14
Building upon this insight, the Lockean jurisdictional solution to the
social strife created by comprehensive religious claims came gradually to
be adopted to handle lesser conflicts over mere moral disagreements. Just
as the jurisdictions of sovereign monarchs are limited to their respective
geographical territories, the jurisdiction of sovereign individuals is limited
to their bodies and their justly acquired physical possessions. As in
international relations, force is justified to keep everyone within their
boundaries but, so long as they are operating within their respective
jurisdictions and not invading the rightful jurisdiction or domains of others,
individuals should be free to make their own moral choices. Just like the
King.
The more decisions that are viewed as matters of individual
sovereignty, the more “libertarian” this approach becomes. Indeed, modern
libertarianism can be viewed as the push to see how many types of
decisions can feasibly be delegated to the realm of individual sovereignty.
11
12
13
14

Id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 46.
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The debate between libertarians and others, and among libertarians
themselves, is precisely about how far this process of delegation can be
taken.
It is inaccurate to characterize this argument for delegation as
premised on some “atomistic individualism” that assumes that each man is
an island independent of others in society, any more than did Westphalian
monarchical sovereignty assume atomistic nation states. To the contrary,
what is sought are the prerequisites of peaceful social coexistence in a
world in which each person’s actions are very likely to affect others. As
with conflicts between contending nation states that are resolved by
recognizing political sovereignty, the problems of social conflict and
interdependence are solved, rather than denied, by the recognition of
individual sovereignty.
True, historically, in the United States as elsewhere, whole categories
of persons were denied the individual sovereignty that this approach favors.
African slaves were under the jurisdiction of their masters, as were white
indentured servants from Europe. Daughters were deemed to be under the
jurisdiction of their fathers and wives of their husbands, with legally
independent single adult women considered anomalies. This did not entail
that the individual sovereignty approach was wrong, but merely that the
delegation of jurisdiction was incomplete. Having devolved from the
paternal King to the slaveholder or to the father of the family, it needed to
go still farther to recognize the sovereignty of each adult, regardless of the
irrelevant characteristics of race or sex.
As we know, the partial delegation that existed at the time of the
Founding of the United States was merely a way station to the completely
egalitarian devolution of jurisdiction to the individual. Indeed, the liberal
case for the “natural rights” of private property and freedom of contract
provided a potent argument against both slavery and legal paternalism.15
This is not to say that no person today remains under the jurisdiction
of others. Children are under the jurisdiction of their guardians, and the
mentally incompetent can be the wards of others as well. But these
exceptions are fully consistent with the fundamental premise that all
competent persons sui juris are the proper rulers of themselves. Indeed, any
scheme by which the properly defined jurisdiction of fully competent
persons is overridden by the will of others treats sovereign individuals as
though they were children or mentally infirm (or women under coverture or
slaves). And any scheme that denies or disparages individual sovereignty
also presupposes that whoever is given the authority to rule individual
adults—whether a monarch or some faction of society—is superior in some
manner to the individual sui juris, a claim that begins to replicate the

15 See Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One?: The Abolitionist Origins of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 165 (2011) (discussing abolitionist constitutionalism).
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dynamic that led to the religious wars, and was used to justify slavery and
the subordination of women.
THE MODESTY OF MODERN LIBERTARIANISM
It should now be clear that modern libertarianism merely takes
individual sovereignty seriously, and tries to push this concept as far as it
can feasibly go. For libertarians, as for Locke, “private property” is the
concept that defines the proper jurisdiction of each sovereign person who is
sui juris or competent to manage his or her own affairs. And freedom of
contract governs the transfers of these property rights from one person to
another. The proposition that one should not have one’s justly acquired
property taken by others without one’s consent is inimical to schemes of
social justice.
“Liberty” for a libertarian, then, is not the Hobbesian freedom to do
whatever you will. Instead, it is the Lockean freedom to do whatever you
will with what is yours. There is simply no libertarianism without
jurisdictional limits on freedom of action; the concept of property defines
these limits and is what differentiates liberty from license. Libertarianism is
distinctive in its attempt to limit coercion to the protection of these
jurisdictional boundaries to the greatest practicable extent. Forcible
interference by some with the liberty that is within the sovereign
jurisdiction of others is as offensive to libertarianism as the unprovoked
forcible interference of one national sovereign within the boundaries of
another is offensive to the prevailing view of international relations.
However “radical” this might sound in the abstract, it is actually a far
more modest approach than either social justice or legal moralism.
Although the line between “mine and thine” must be drawn, doing so is far
more practical than specifying the morality of the entirety of human action.
Although rules and principles governing the just acquisition, use, and
transfer of property must be identified, this is a far more manageable and
less divisive and dangerous a task than continually readjusting the
distribution of holdings, suppressing the acquisition of property altogether,
or identifying a stable principle of “fair share.”
Moreover, because proponents of social justice and legal moralism
typically propose superimposing their schemes onto existing structures of
private property and freedom of contract, rather than supplanting them
altogether, these stances are necessarily more ambitious than simply
limiting legal coercion to the libertarian core that must still be ascertained
and enforced. Put another way, no matter how challenging the task of
properly defining the proper jurisdictions of individual sovereigns may be,
adding considerations of social justice, legal moralism, or both, to this task
is that much more challenging. In this sense, libertarianism is necessarily
more modest than either social justice or legal moralism.
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In contrast with the tyrannies we have witnessed in the social justice
of the U.S.S.R. and the legal moralism of the Muslim world, the most
objectionable version of a libertarian political system we have experienced,
in which the sovereignty of a portion of the citizenry was denied, evolved
in a more, rather than less, egalitarian direction. The recognition of
individual sovereignty creates a virtuous circle that tends to eliminate
whatever irrelevant legal discrimination was inherited from a more ancient
and illiberal legal tradition.
DO SOCIAL DEMOCRACIES PROVIDE A BETTER MIDDLE WAY?
What about the social democracies of Western Europe or, to a lesser
but increasing extent, the now-expanding social welfare state in the United
States? Do not these political systems combine the individual sovereignty
of private property with the redistribution of social justice, as well as some
degree of legal moralism? Do these not represent the true “middle
ground”—or what was once called the Third Way—between an
unconstrained system of either social justice or legal moralism on the one
hand and the unconstrained liberty of libertarianism on the other? If these
types of political arrangements are feasible, does this not undermine the
libertarian objection to social justice, legal moralism, or both?
In some ways, the answer to this last question is “yes.” Superimposing
a degree of wealth or income redistribution, or morals legislation, on a
robust base of private property is infinitely preferable to the radical, singleminded pursuit of either social justice or legal moralism. But this response
to the case for libertarianism is really a concession, rather than a genuine
objection. For it concedes that libertarian principles of property provide a
necessary baseline upon which some less-than-total scheme of
redistribution or moral regulation can be superimposed, notwithstanding
that the existence of this baseline is often contested by intellectuals on the
Left.
Moreover, the challenge posed to libertarianism by social democracy
assumes its feasibility. But what if such an approach is infeasible? What if
superimposing social justice or legal moralism on the individual
sovereignty defined by private property and freedom of contract is
ultimately unstable? Why might this be?
Perhaps institutions with sufficient power to effectuate social justice
or to impose morality will inevitably be captured by the more powerful
forces in society and put to other ends. Perhaps they will inevitably be used
for a purpose that does not conform to the proper conception of social
justice or morality. After all, as noted above, what realistic assurances have
we ever been offered that such power can be limited to whatever theory is
being advanced to justify its creation?
What happens in a social democracy when 51% of the voters discover
it can vote to “redistribute” the wealth of—or impose their moral vision
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upon—the other 49%? Or more likely, what happens when political
entrepreneurs inspire, say, 80% of the electorate to confiscate the income or
wealth of the 20%? When this happens, how will social democracy
preserve the individual sovereignty that the Third Way approach concedes
is needed as a baseline? What realistic mechanisms are proposed by
advocates of the Third Way superimposition of social justice or legal
moralism on the libertarian rights of property and contract to ensure against
this outcome?
I have been teaching law and writing about liberty for over thirty years
now, and I have yet to hear any such proposal from any of my colleagues.
It would be genuinely enlightening to hear how advocates of supplanting or
overriding the libertarian rights that define individual sovereignty propose
to limit the coercive powers they seek to the particular vision of social
justice or morality that they offer to justify this claim of power. It would be
equally enlightening to hear proponents of social democracy tell us how it
will not eventually devour the individual rights that provide the foundation
for their additional schemes of redistribution or morals regulation. Is this
not a reasonable request?
LIBERTARIAN APPROACHES TO LIMITING GOVERNMENTAL POWER
In contrast, libertarians do offer a solution or two to the problem of
limiting government power to the protection of individual sovereignty.
Like their classical liberal ancestors, most modern libertarians favor
constitutionally-limited government, in which power is structurally divided
among different branches of a federal or national government, and between
the limited powers of the national government and the broader police
powers of states and municipalities.
These libertarians also typically favor the enforcement of these limits
by what Madison called, “independent tribunals of justice.” In particular,
they believe that, although state legislatures have a general police power to
prohibit the actions of some individuals that violate the sovereignty of
others, when legislatures wish instead to “regulate” the otherwise rightful
exercise of liberty by sovereign individuals, these regulations must be
justified as reasonably necessary to protect the rights, health, and safety of
other sovereign individuals. When disputes about whether such regulations
are reasonably necessary to protect the right of others arise between the
individuals who comprise a “legislature” and the sovereign individuals
whose actions are the subject of these regulations—that is between the
agents and their principals—the benefit of the doubt ought to go to the
principals rather than those who are supposed to be their agents.
In short, these libertarians favor something very much like, if not
identical to, the original meaning of the Constitution of the United States—
the whole Constitution, including those parts that protect the unenumerated
rights retained by the people and the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States. In this, however, they are today opposed to their left by

Do Not Delete

2013]

4/9/2013 10:09 PM

Afterword: The Libertarian Middle Way

361

“progressives” who wish to achieve their vision of social justice at the
national level by “interpreting” federal power broadly enough to address
any problem they deem to be “national” in scope—which is to say every
problem.
To their right, libertarians are also opposed by social conservatives
some of whom maintain that majorities in state legislatures have the right
to enact their moral preferences into law, unconstrained by any judiciallyenforced limits on their ability to restrict the liberty of the sovereign
individual citizen.16 These conservatives deny that judges have the power
to protect the liberty of the individual by ensuring that legislatures are truly
exercising a proper conception of their textually unenumerated police
power. Since the Constitution contains few express limitations on the
legislative power of states—and what limits it does provide have largely
been interpreted out of existence—these conservatives contend that states
have a virtually unlimited power to legislate morality.
Put more positively, libertarians side with progressives against the
legal moralism of the social conservatives, and with the conservatives
against the social justice agenda of progressives. In this regard, they can be
viewed as an independent or “swing” vote between the left and right.
Indeed, many progressives would prefer living in a libertarian world to
having the moral code of social conservatives imposed upon them. And
many social conservatives would prefer the libertarian world in which they
are left alone to practice their religion than to have the progressive’s vision
of social justice (or secular morality) imposed upon them. Like religious
toleration, for many who favor a comprehensive social system, the
libertarian vision is their second-best option, with the first best being their
own comprehensive vision of social justice or morality being imposed on
everyone, and their last best being their opponent’s comprehensive vision
imposed upon them.
But libertarians have not one but two responses to how the coercive
power needed for individual sovereignty can be confined to its only proper
function of protecting individual sovereignty. Having observed the
continued decline of respect for the limits on state and federal power
contained in the U.S. Constitution, some libertarians favor a more radical
alternative. They would see law enforcement and adjudication be handled
competitively rather than by monopolistic government agencies.17 They
favor consumer choice and competition as the best check on the abuse of
the powers of law enforcement.18 While this alternative is highly
controversial, even among libertarians, it should at least be mentioned in a
16 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 124 (1990) (“Moral outrage is a sufficient ground for prohibitory legislation.”).
17 See, e.g., MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY: THE LIBERTARIAN MANIFESTO 215–
41 (rev. ed. 1996) (discussing police protection and judicial services provided by free market).
18 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW
257–83 (1998) (discussing feasibility of a polycentric legal order).
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discussion of institutional mechanisms favored by libertarians to keep the
use of power within the boundaries that libertarians, along with most
others, take to be just.
In contrast with advocates of social justice or legal moralism, then,
libertarians and their classical liberal forbearers have paid considerable
attention to how government power can be limited to the protection of the
rights defining individual sovereignty that libertarians favor. However
persuasive their responses to this problem may be, they cannot be accused
of ignoring it or treating it with less than the seriousness this problem
deserves.
LIBERTARIANISM AND LAW
With all this as background, we are in a better position to understand
the contribution that libertarianism can make to law. The first contribution
is to identify the proper boundaries of individual sovereignty. Historically,
this has been done by the private law subjects of property, contract, and
torts. At the risk of oversimplification, the law of property governs the
acquisition of land and possessions, the law of contract governs the
consensual transfer of entitlements from one person to another, and the law
of torts defines the proper use of property. For better or worse, these
common-law subjects have historically provided the positive law that
identifies the scope of individual sovereignty. Although the existing law of
these subjects may not be perfectly libertarian, they have nevertheless been
libertarian to a remarkable degree.
Libertarianism is an abstract theory, in the sense that the principles of
private property and freedom of contract that define liberty are derived
from an abstract description of human beings and the social context in
which they exist. By this I mean that libertarianism is essentially egalitarian
insofar as it is based on those abstract qualities that all humans share in
common with each other, rather than on the particularities that differentiate
one person from another. Because these principles are derived from an
abstracted understanding of human beings, however, libertarian principles
are themselves highly abstract—often too abstract to handle anything but
the most basic social conflicts. Murder, rape, robbery, theft and the like are
unjust and to be legally prohibited. But one learns quickly in law school
and in practice that the particularities of human social interaction are often
far too complex to be regulated by these abstract principles of justice alone.
For this reason, we not only need an abstract and often
underdeterminate conception of justice, but also a rule of law. We need
largely conventional rules and principles to apply to the particularities of
the actual conflicts that arise in complex societies. While these legal rules
and principles are constrained by the abstract principles of justice, they
cannot be logically derived from them.19
19

See id. at 108–14 (discussing the underdeterminacy of abstract principles of justice).
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Libertarian legal theorists therefore operate within the private law
pretty much the same way other legal theorists do. Their distinctive
perspective is the stress they place on the overriding social importance of
defining the individual’s sovereignty by means of property, contract, and
tort, preserving the discretion of individual choice within the boundaries
that these concepts provide, and resisting the effort to override these
concepts with claims based on social justice or legal moralism.
So, for example, my contracts scholarship has stressed the role of the
consent of the parties, as opposed to using contract law to effectuate other
social ends.20 As someone who has participated in the debate over the
proper basis of contractual obligation for several decades, I can testify that
the libertarian position is a meaningful alternative to those that would have
consent discounted, or disregarded altogether, in favor of other objectives,
be they social justice, morality, or efficiency.
Libertarian legal theorists typically conceive the protection of these,
the basic private law rights of individual sovereignty, as the ultimate
justification for the public law. Conceptually they advance the proposition
that “first comes rights, and then comes government”—or as the
Declaration of Independence affirmed, all men are equally endowed “with
certain unalienable Rights” and that “to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men.”21
As discussed above, they view a written constitution as one means,
among others, of confining the coercive power of government to its proper
function of protecting the individual’s private law rights. To this end, some
libertarians defend the importance of a written constitution that is enforced
by an independent judiciary.22 They evaluate the legitimacy of any
constitution, including the Constitution of the United States, by this
criterion: how well does it protect the private rights of all persons in the
jurisdiction in which it governs?23 Many, if not most, libertarians believe
that if the original meaning of the U.S. Constitution—as amended to extend
the equal protection of the laws to women and those who had previously
been enslaved—was actually followed, it would largely keep government
within its proper powers.

20 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986)
(discussing consent theory of contract). For a later and more developed summary, see RANDY E.
BARNETT, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: CONTRACTS (2010).
21 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Of course, the full quote reads as
follows:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . .
22 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 100–12 (2004) (discussing the importance of a written constitution).
23 See, e.g., id. at 32–52 (discussing constitutional legitimacy without consent).
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THE LIBERTARIAN FOCUS ON MEANS RATHER THAN ENDS
In the end, there emerges a fundamental contrast between social
justice and legal moralism on the one hand and libertarianism on the other:
Advocates of social justice and legal moralism are concerned with “ends”
to the exclusion of any serious consideration of means. All persons should
have X amount of stuff. All persons should act, or refrain from acting, in
certain ways. In addition to the failure to reach anything close to
consensus—even among themselves—on what these ends should be, what
is principally lacking is any serious attention to (a) the means by which
one’s favored end will be achieved, and (b) how the coercive institutions
will be limited to just these correct ends without being perverted to pursue
other ends that are deemed by any particular social justice or legal moralist
to be unjust and immoral.
In contrast, libertarianism is concerned almost exclusively with means
rather than with ends. Even the fundamental rights of private property and
freedom of contract that principally define liberty are conceived by
libertarians as means to the pursuit of happiness while living in society
with others, rather than as ends in themselves. To be sure, the protection of
these rights is treated as the end of government, but only because
government itself is perceived by many libertarians as a regrettably
necessary means of protecting property and contract.
Of course, libertarians are seriously concerned with one end: the
pursuit of the good life, or what the Declaration referred to as “the pursuit
of happiness.” It is this end that motivates their commitment to such means
as private rights and constitutionally-limited government. But, as was
described above, most libertarians believe that liberty is necessary precisely
because the end of happiness will vary with the uniquely varying
circumstances, goals and aspirations of particular individuals, and because
living the good life is a do-it-yourself affair. Therefore, just as something
like the private law concepts of property, contract and torts are an
inescapable means to the pursuit of happiness in a social context, the search
for effective means of limiting the exercise of governmental power to the
protection of just these private law rights is the proper subject of the public
law.
Imprecations to the contrary notwithstanding, libertarians are far more
concerned with the actual real-world practicalities of using legal coercion
than those who only focus on the ends of social justice or legal moralism.
Real world experience, libertarians maintain, has demonstrated that
governmental implementation of either social justice or legal moralism has
led to dystopias almost beyond our ability to imagine. In contrast, even an
imperfect commitment to private individual rights and limited
constitutional government has led to the greatest prosperity in human
history.
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Of course, none of this is easy to prove. If it were, libertarianism
would have either vanquished its intellectual foes or been defeated by
them. But consider what may be the ultimate empirical proof of the
superiority of even imperfectly adhering to libertarian principles: Which
way do the refugees run? Which countries need to restrict the exit of their
citizens? Were people clamoring to get into or out of the U.S.S.R.? Are
they lined up to enter the Mullocracy of Iran? To the extent they can,
people vote with their feet for the increased prosperity and choice made
possible by the more robust protection of property as compared with other
governmental systems. Persons who are capable of relocating tend to leave
societies preoccupied by the pursuit of social justice or legal morality, and
beat a path to the door of societies who pursue some semblance of the
libertarian middle way. As empirical proofs go, this one is probably as
good as any other.
Given that there is no truly libertarian society, this is a comparative
matter. Which societies better protect the rights of property and contract
than others? But, in the end, this too is why libertarianism is modest.
Libertarians formulate and advance their models of complete liberty as a
means of incrementally inching existing societies in a more libertarian
direction. Libertarians believe that good things will happen as this progress
is made, and if we ever reach a point where the protection of property
rights is having a counterproductive effect, we can stop there. In the
meantime, we have a long way to go before we reach that point. Or so says
the libertarian middle way.

